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TAX PITFALLS
GEORGE J. LAiKiN
In the case of the "misplaced decimal point," the taxpayer was
trapped by the innocent error of an employee. In preparing a capital
stock tax return for the Lerner Stores Corporation, the decimal point
was inadvertantly placed so that the value of its capital stock was
declared to be $25,000 instead of $2,500,000 as intended. An amended
capital stock tax return was proferred for filing as soon as the error
was discovered. It was rejected, however, because the period of
limitations had expired. The Supreme Court of the United States
recognized' that "the hardship resulting from the misplaced decimal
point was plain," but held that "Congress not the Court is the source
of relief." That decimal point cost the taxpayer dearly.
A misplaced decimal point is comparatively easy to detect. Most
pitfalls are so concealed that only eternal vigilance can prevent en-
trapment. Ignorance of the law and mistake have been rejected as
excuses. While the Supreme Court has declared that "it is not the
purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of opinion or inno-
cent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care,"2 what is
"reasonable care" involves a test which is subjective, elusive, and
speculative. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is now asserting a
25% penalty against corporate taxpayers who did not file excess
profits tax returns believing that they were not subject to the tax.8
PROBLEmS AFFECTING LAWYERS
Tax complexities are present in every phase of the practice of
the law. Some involve the lawyer himself. Thus, attorneys frequently
receive substantial fees at the conclusion of litigation pending for
several years. Considerable income is pyramided in one year and
a disproportionate amount thereof would be paid in taxes were it
not for the relief provided by Section 107 of the Internal Revenue
'Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corporation, 314 U.S. 463 (1941).
2 Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1942).
3 Southeastern Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1069 (1945) aff'd, South-
eastern Finance Company v. Commissioner, 153 F(2d) 205 (CCA 5th 1496);
Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, (CCA 4th) decided December 23, 1946 (1947
P. ki. Par. 72,298). See dissents in Economy Savings and Loan Company v.
Commissioner, 5 T.C. 543 (1945) and P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 5
T.C. 79 (1941), aff'd CCA 4th, supra.
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Code. It provides that if 80% of the total compensation for services
which have been rendered over a period of more than thirty-six
months is received in one year, the tax shall not be greater than the
aggregate of the tax which would have been paid had the compen-
sation been received ratably over the entire period during which the
services have been performed. The attorney may recompute his
income and his taxes as if he had received a proportional amount
of the fee during each year services were rendered with obvious
savings in income taxes. Upon being engaged in a matter of sub-
stance, the attorney should be careful not to receive more than
20% of the anticipated fee before his services are concluded; 4 and
that the services will be completed within the same year when at
least 80% of the compensation is finally paid.5
Section 107 does not require the attorney to lump together all
fees received from a client for services rendered for him in a variety
of matters. Each matter may be treated separately." Adequate rec-
ords should, therefore, be kept with respect to all matters to which
Section 107 may be applicable.
Attorneys who entertain clients at home or who have home law
libraries should not overlook the possibility of depreciation deduc-
tions. Thus, in Beaudry v. Commissioner1 the Tax Court ruled
that depreciation deductions were allowable with respect to a rug,
radio, cocktail table and other items which were part of the equip-
ment of an attorney's home library used exclusively for business
purposes.
Some attorneys claim deductions for dues to golf and other clubs.
This may be done only if it can be established that such expenditures
are necessary in the conduct of the attorney's practice and that busi-
ness benefits may be expected therefrom.8 The attorney should recog-
nize that he may be required to give the names of new clients or
the amount of new business derived from contacts made through
the clubs. That club memberships are generally helpful in obtaining
clients is not a sufficient ground for allowing the deductions.9
4 Cf. ranna v. Commissioner, 156 F(2d) 135 (CCA 9th 1946).
5Treasury Regulations 111, Sec. 29.107-1.6Cf. Nast v. Commissioner 7 T.C. 432 (1946).
7 Beaudry v. Commissioner, decided March 25, 1943 (1943 P-H Memorandum
Decisions Service, Par. 43,156), aff'd, 150 F (2d) 20 (CCA 2nd 1945), and on
remand, Beaudry v. Commissioner, decided February 6, 1946 (1946 P-H Memo-
randum Decisions Service, Par. 46,030).8 Boehm v. Commissioner, 35 BTA 1106 (1937):
o Boehm v. Commissioner, supra; Lellyett & Rogers, Inc. v. Commissioner, de-





The field of domestic- relations has not escaped its share of tax
pitfalls. Every party to a divorce proceeding involving alimony or
property will find it advantageous to consider tax implications.
Under the Internal Revenue Code'0 the amount paid periodically
by a husband to his wife under a "decree of divorce or separate main-
tenance" in discharge of a "legal obligation which, because of the
marital or family relationship is imposed upon or incurred by such
husband under such decree or under a written instrument incident
to such divorce or separation" are deductible from the husband's
income and taxable to the wife.
In Kalchthaler v. Commissionern the taxpayer had deserted his
wife and failed to provide for her support. Proceedings were insti-
tuted by the wife in the Pennsylvania courts to compel support.
She obtained a judgment requiring the husband to pay a weekly
sum for her support. When the tax consequences were reviewed,
the Tax Court pointed out that judgment for support was not a
decree of divorce or legal separation; that the taxpayer's wife was
not legally separated from him; that the deduction is available to
the husband only if the payments were made to a "wife who is
divorced or legally separated from her husband under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance." As a consequence, it held that
the taxpayer was not entitled to deductions for amounts paid to his
separated wife.
In Brown v. Commissioner'2 the Tax Court denied a husband
any deduction for sums paid in accordance with a separation agree-
ment entered into without court proceedings, pointing out that such
payments were not made under a decree as required by the Internal
Revenue Code. Private agreements do not qualify.
Temporary alimony is not deductible by the husband. To be
deductible the payments must be made after a decree has been
entered.'3
Payments made by a husband for the support of his children are
not deductible under the Internal Revenue Code. Even though such
payments are received by the wife, they are not taxable to her if
she merely received them on behalf of the children. A judgment in
a divorce matter should, therefore, clearly differentiate between the
amounts paid as alimony and as support money.14 The consequence
of failing to do so is illustrated by Moitoret v. Commissioner." Here
10 Sec. 22(k) and Sec. 23(w) I.R.C.
"L-7 T.C. 625 (1946).
127 T.C. 715 (1946).
"3Wick v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 723 (1946).
'4 Budd v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 413 (1946) Regs. 111, Sec. 29.22(k)-1.
15 7 T.C. 640 (1946).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the taxpayer was a divorced wife. The decree provided for pay-
ments to the wife for the support and maintenance of herself and
the minor children, but did not alocate any specific sum for the
children. The wife contended that to the extent that the payments
were made to support the children, they should not be taxable to
her. The Tax Court, however, interpreted the decree of the divorce
court literally and taxed the whole amount to her.
To be deductible by the husband, the payments under a divorce
decree must be periodic; they must be on an installment basis. Sec-
tion 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "an install-
ment payment shall be considered a periodic payment for the pur-
poses of this sub-section if the principal sum, by the terms of the
decree or instrument, may be or is to be paid within a period ending
more than 10 years from the date of such decree or instrument ..."
A lump sum settlement does not qualify as a deduction to the hus-
band. It is not income to the wife.16 If under a divorce settlement
the husband is required to pay $10,000 at the rate of $1,000 a year
for ten years, the first payment to be made as of the date of the
judgment of the divorce, the payments would not be deductible to
the husband, or taxable to the wife, because the full amount of the
settlement will have been paid prior to the end of ten years after
the date of the divorce judgment. If divorce settlement payments
are to be deductible, the installments must extend over a period suffi-
ciently long so that the last installment will be made more than ten
years from the date of the judgment.
The impact of the Federal tax law upon divorce and legal sepa-
rations is now so great that one writer suggested that the marriage
vow be revised to conclude "until death or taxes do us part."1"
INTER-FAMILY TRANSACTIONS
Transactions between members of a family are full of tax pit-
falls. A wife's substantive rights to property acquired from her hus-
band may have little bearing upon tax consequences. 18 It has been
16 Regs. 111, Sec. 29.22(k)-1. A lump sum divorce settlement is not a taxable gift
to the wife. Converse v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945).
17 Weisbard, Taxation of Family Liquidation, Taxes, November 1946, page 1055.
18 The attempt to tax a husband upon the income received by members of his
family on the theory that he exercised control over their property or incomes
has reached the point that Circuit Judge Learned Hand in Kohnstamm v.
Pedrick, 153 F(2d) 506 (CCA 2nd 1945) was forced to declare: "We cannot
understand on what conceivable theory the income from the investments made
by the children's mother is to be taken as the (father's). The (Collector)
suggests nothing to support this extraordinary position except that she (the
wife) uniformly consulted her husband about what she should do. It would
indeed add terror to marital confidences if, whenever a woman asked her
husband's advice, sporadically or uniformly, about what to do with their chil-
dren's money, she took the chance that their income would be added to his
for purposes of taxation. It may be that for tax purposes the jural indissolu-
bility of the family will in the end be restored to the position it occupied in
archaic law; but so far that has not happened."
['Vol. 30
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aptly said that "bed chamber arrangements" between a husband and
wife will be viewed with suspicion. The courts refuse to recognize
"concepts of ownership . . . fashioned out of legal niceties which
may have little or no significance in . . . household arrangements." 19
The current attack on husband and wife partnerships illustrates the
divergence between tax law and the substantive law. Yet there are
situations where tax consequences are governed by "legal niceties."
Notwithstanding the assault on family partnerships, if title to
real estate is held in joint tenancy by a husband and wife under the
laws of a state which give the wife an equal vested interest in the
real estate and to the income therefrom' the Bureau of Internal
Revenue has consistently ruled that the income is divisible between
them.21 Under these rulings, it is apparently of no significance that
the wife's interest in the jointly held property was acquired through
gift.2
Typical of special provisions relating to family transactions are
those prohibiting deductions for losses arising from sales or exchanges
of property directly or indirectly between members of a family. 3
To illustrate:
Suppose A owns securities which have fallen in market value. He
wishes to sell and claim a loss. Yet he has sufficient faith in the
securities that he would like to retain them for his family. If he
sells the securities directly to his wife, he is precluded from claiming
a loss even though she pays him the current market value.? If the
securities are listed and A sells them with the thought of having
Mrs. A repurchase them immediately through the exchange, A's
loss may nevertheless be disallowed? 5 There are conflicting de-
cisions with respect to this. In Commissioner v. McWilliams,0 the
Sixth Circuit, and in Commissioner v. Kohn,27 the Fourth Circuit,
held that a loss could not be taken by a husband on the securities re-
purchased by the wife, even though such sale and purchase took
place through the medium of a public exchange. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Commissioner v. Ickelheimer,s took a contrary
view and allowed the loss. No doubt, the Supreme Court will resolve
this conflict.
'9 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 5331 (1940).
20 This is the situation in Wisconsin. Sec. 246.01; 246.03; 234.21, Wis. Stats, 1945.
21 I.T. 3754, C.B. 1945, p. 143.
22 As distinguished from "typical" family partnership cases such as Commissioner
v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293(1946).
23 Sec. 24(b) (1) (A), I.R.C.
24 Sec. 24(b) (1) (A), I.R.C.
25 See Sec. 118, I.R.C. relating to wash sales..
20 Decided by CCA 6th, Dec. 3, 1946 (1946 P-H par. 72,659).
- Decided by CCA 4th, Nov. 13, 1946 (1946 P-H par. 72,647).
28 132 F(2d) 660 (CCA 2nd, 1943).
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Special tax considerations affecting the family may be further
illustrated by the provisions relating to personal holding companies
wherein an individual is considered as owning the stock of a cor-
poration although title to such stock is held by a member of his
family.2 9 Also by the provisions requiring the immediate payment
of salaries and interest to stockholders owning directly or indirectly
50% or more of the outstanding shares.30
Clearly, before transactions between members of a family are
consummated, the tax implications should be thoroughly investigated.
GiFTs
A owned 100 shares of X Corporation stock which he purchased
at $100. The shares dropped to $20, at which price he sold them
to his son. Later, the market having risen, the son sells them at $40.
While A is precluded from claiming a loss because the sale was made
to a member of his family, the son, nevertheless, will be required
to pay a tax upon the gain he realized when the stock he purchased
from his father at $20 is sold at $40.3
If A had made a gift of the shares to his son, the situation would
have been different. The son would not be required to pay any tax
upon sale of the stock at $40. His basis, as the recipient of the gift,
would have been $100 - the donor's basis.- Moreover, since the 100
shares were worth only $2,000 as of the date of the gift, the transfer
would have been free of any gift taxes. Under the circumstances,
a gift rather than a sale would have been better tax-wise.
It should be noted that while the measure of gain is the difference
between the donor's basis and the amount realized by the recipient
upon sale, if a loss is incurred, the loss is measured by the difference
between the value as of the date of the gift and the amount realized
by the recipient upon sale.3 3 This distinction must be borne in mind
if it is intended that the recipient will sell at a loss in order to offset
other taxable gains which he may have.
Under the Internal Revenue Code a person may make a gift of
$3,000 a year to as many individuals as he chooses without paying
a gift tax." Thus, Jones may each year make a gift of $3,000 to
each of his children without paying a tax. But, if the gift involves
a future interest, if the recipient does not receive immediate rights
to that which is given away, the $3,000 annual exclusion does not
apply. A gift made in trust with income to be accumulated is a
2 Sec. 503, I.R.C.
SO Sec. 24(c) (3) I.R.C.
31 Because Sec. 113 I.R.C. provides no exception to basis in this type of situation.
32 Sec. 113(a) (2) I.R.C.
33 Sec. 113(a) (2) I.R.C.
34 Sec. 1003 (b) (3) I.R.C.
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gift of a future interest and does not qualify for the annual exclusion.
This may be true even though the Trustee is given authority to
use income for the support of a beneficiary if in the Trustee's dis-
cretion it is necessary.3 5
Frequently gifts are made for the purpose of dividing an estate
during the lifetime of the owner. Items to be given away for this
purpose should be those which have not appreciated greatly in value
while held by the donor. Assume A owns stock in X Corporation,
which he has held for many years. He bought the shares for $10.
They are now worth $100. If those shares are given away, the
gift tax will apply to a valuation of $100. If the recipient later sells
the shares at $100, he will pay a tax upon a gain of $90. The sum
of the gift tax and the capital gains tax may actually exceed the
amount of the estate tax that would have been paid with respect to
the shares if they had remained in the estate and passed at death
through a testamentary disposition. A beneficiary receiving these
shares at A's death would have paid a tax upon the gain measured
only by the difference between the value as of the date of death
and the amount realized upon sale. These factors should be given
careful consideration before a person of advanced age effectuates
gifts. There is, of course, always the danger that a gift may be
held to be in contemplation of death and defeat any estate tax
minimization purpose.
JOINT TENANCIES
Gifts creating joint tenancies can prove very expensive tax-wise.
Title to real estate is frequently held by a husband and wife in joint
tenancy. Depending upon the amount involved, the joint tenancy
may cause the property to be subjected to the gift tax as well as
double estate taxes.
The creation of a joint tenancy is a taxable event under the gift
tax laws.36 The value of a gift will be determined on the basis of
actuarial principles. Upon death of the husband title to the entire
property automatically vests in the wife, but his half is subject to
tax in his estate. If the wife retains the property until her death,
the share she received from her husband will again be subject to
estate taxes. Hence, consideration should be given to the use of
a trust instead of a joint tenancy. The trust permits tax economies
and provides for the continuity of title. Individuals with taxable
estates should avoid joint tenancies.
35 Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945) ; Commissioner v. Disston, 325




The will and testametary trust, so important in the disposition of
an individual's estate, are replete with tax difficulties and uncertainties.
A few of the pitfalls will be illustrated.
A good will cannot be drawn unless the attorney has sufficient
knowledge concerning his client's financial affairs and family situa-
tion. For example: Suppose A, a man of considerable means, en-
gages an attorney to draw a will. A is advised as to the desirability
of creating a testamentary trust, and as to the possible estate tax
economies. A agrees to this program. However, A fails to disclose,
and the attorney fails to discover, that A has substantial amounts
of life insurance from which his wife is to receive stated monthly
payments. The will as drawn contains no specific provision for the
payment of estate or inheritance taxes. Upon the death of A, Mrs. A
is the beneficiary under a testamentary trust and the recipient of
fixed payments from life insurance. The Executor of A's estate is
faced with the duty of collecting from Mrs. A the proportionate
amount of Federal estate tax which the face amount of life insurance
bears to A's entire net estate.7 Mrs. A is thus in the very difficult
position of having to raise money to pay the estate taxes attribut-
able to life insurance proceeds which she will not receive except in
installments over a period of many years. Clearly, this is not what
A had in mind when he made his estate plans.38
Every well drawn will should contain specific directions covering
payment of the estate and inheritance taxes. Without such a pro-
vision, it is impossible to plan with certainty for the support and
maintenance of dependents and beneficiaries.
Many wills are drawn leaving the whole of a substantial estate
to the surviving spouse. The fact that upon the death of the spouse
another set of estate taxes and death charges will be payable is not
considered. Often a will is drawn leaving the entire estate to a
wife and expressing the hope that she will take care of the children.
This, too, subjects the entire estate to a second tax at the death
of the wife. Such double taxation can be avoided. Present high
estate tax rates make it necessary to postpone as long as possible
the vesting of title to an estate in heirs and beneficiaries. The trust
medium should be used for this purpose.
Where a number of beneficiaries are involved, consideration should
be given to the creation of several separate, rather than a single,
testamentary trust. Separate trusts make for greater ease in planning
and administering an estate. Income tax economies are possible. If
3 Sec. 826(c) I.R.C.
38 The same problem is also present with respect to property passing pursuant to
a power of appointment. Sec. 826 (c) I.R.C.
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only one trust is created, and the income therefrom is to be accumu-
lated, such income will be subject to tax in higher brackets than
if the same amount were divided amongst several trusts. Multiple
exemptions will be available. Lower tax brackets will be applicable.
The provisions of a testamentary trust must be flexible so as to
provide for the needs of beneficiaries as conditions change. Great
care must, however, be exercised lest the provisions designed to
provide flexibility subject the estate to a second tax at the death
of a beneficiary.
Provision is frequently made in a testamentary trust for the pay-
ment of the income to a widow plus such additional amounts of
principal as she may from time to time demand. The effect of such
a provision is to give the widow complete control over the estate
left in trust for her and the entire amount thereof would be subject
to estate taxes at her death. If, however, the right to invade corpus
is vested in someone other than the widow, such invasion can take
place for her benefit without double estate tax consequences. Such
discretion may be exercised by a Trustee, provided the widow is
not the Trustee. 9
Frequently an estate is to be devoted to charitable purposes after
the death of certain life beneficiaries. Charitable bequests are not
subject to the estate tax.40 However, if the right to invade principal
is given, the amount to be devoted to charitable purposes becomes
uncertain and the deduction for the charitable bequest may be lost.41
The right to invade should be sharply circumscribed, if not entirely
eliminated, lest the hoped for estate tax minimization fail to ma-
terialize.
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
Many problems arise in connection with real estate transactions.
One of them relates to the deductibility of real estate taxes adjusted
as of the time of closing. The general rule is that real estate taxes
are deductible when paid or accrued depending upon the accounting
method employed.2 Assessments for local benefits, however, are not
deductible.4 3 The distinction depends upon whether the levy is im-
posed to pay for some local improvement which benefits only a limited
number of property owners and is collectible only from them. When
it is, there is no deduction.
When real estate transactions are closed, the purchaser custom-
arily reimburses the seller for the portion of any taxes already paid
89Regs. 105, Sec. 8124(1); Sec. 811(f) I.R.C. See also as to the income tax,
Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22(a)-22, as added by T.D. 5488; Jergens v. Commissioner,
136 F(2d) 497 (CCA 5 1943), cert. den. 320 U.S. 784.
4o Sec. 812(d) I.R.C..
41 Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 151 F(2d) 592 (CCA 1st 1945).
42 For date of accrual under Wisconsin Law see G.C.M. 24599, 1945 C.B. 110.
43 Regs. 111, Sec. 29.23(c)-3.
1947]
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which is allocable to the period following the closing. When the
taxes for the current period are not yet payable, the seller credits
the purchaser with the portion allocable to the period during which
he (the seller) held title." This common practice does not, however,
determine which of the parties is entitled to a deduction for income
tax purposes. The rule is that if the tax is a personal obligation of
the seller or a lien on the property prior to the closing date, the
purchaser may not deduct the tax even though it is paid by him.
The tax is treated as a part of the cost of the property.4 5 If, how-
ever, the tax is neither a personal obligation of the seller, nor a
lien prior to the closing date, the purchaser may deduct the entire
tax paid. The amount which he received from the seller at the
closing is treated as a reduction of the selling price. These rules
operate regardless of the closing method employed.
If an owner of real estate, operating on a cash basis, were to
pay 1948 real estate taxes on December 31, 1947, such taxes would
not be deductible in 1948 even though the taxpayer paid them for
and intended to claim them in 1948. They must be deducted in the
year in which they were paid or accrued.46 Hence, the income for
both 1947 and 1948 would be distorted. Such distortions can prove
expensive.
Under long term or valuable leases, the payment of advance rentals
or the deposit of security create tax problems. Care must be exer-
cised lest advance payments or the deposit of security constitute
taxable income to the landlord in the year in which such advance
payments were made or the security was deposited. The general
rule is that advance rentals paid upon the execution of a lease without
restriction as to the disposition or enjoyment thereof by the landlord
are taxable in full in the year received and cannot be apportioned
over the term of the lease.47 This rule applies whether the landlord
is on a cash basis or on the accrual basis.48  Sums deposited with
the landlord solely for the purposes of security, which are to be
kept intact and refunded to the lessee upon termination of the lease,
do not ordinarily constitute income to the lessor.4 9
A security provision in the lease whereby the lessee deposits a
sum of money to be applied against the rental for the last period of
44This is now the rule in Wisconsin by statute. Sec. 74.62, Wis. Stats, as amend-
ed by c.495, Laws of 1945.45Magruder v. Supplee, 319 U.S. 394 (1942); Commissioner v. LeRoy, 152
F(2d) 936, CCA 2d 1945).
46 Sec. 43 I.R.C.
47O'Day Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 1230; Renwick, et al, v.
United States, 87 F(2d) 123 (CCA 7th 1937).
48 Cf. C. H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 31 BTA 190 (1934) ; Scott v. Com-
missioner, 27 BTA 951 (1933).
49 Estate of Barker v. Commissioner, 13 BTA 562; Clinton Hotel Realty Corp.
v. Commissioner, 128 F(2d) 968 (CCA 5th 1942).
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the lease in the event all other conditions have been performed is
vulnerable on the ground that there are no restrictions against the
use of the funds by the landlord. Such a deposit actually constitutes
an advance payment of rental.
Although the lessor must pay income taxes on advance rentals
in the year of receipt, the lessee is required to amortize the advance
payments over the term of the lease.5°
Where a lessee makes extensive improvements, he may amortize
the cost thereof over the period of the lease. If the lease contains
an option to renew, amortization must nevertheless be based upon
only the principal term of the lease without taking into consideration
the renewal period.5' Unless this is done, the loss of some amortiza-
tion deductions may occur in the event the lease is not renewed or
extended.
Where a closely held corporation pays rent to a major stockholder,
the question may arise as to whether a portion of the rent should
not be disallowed on the ground that it is excessive - that it is in
part a distribution of corporate profits. This occurred in Limericks,
Inc. v. Commissioner. 2 Here the majority stockholder and his wife
owned all but one qualifying share. They also owned the real estate,
which they purchased for $50,000 and rented to the corporation at
$18,000 a year. The Tax Court held that a fair rental for the
property was only $8,400 a year and treated the rest of the payments
as a distribution of corporate profits not deductible by the corporation,
but taxable to the recipients.
One of the factors contributing to the Tax Court's ruling in the
Limerick's case was that the corporation had advertised extensively
through printed media and on the radio that their business had moved
"out of the high rent, high tax district," and that the customers
would "save the difference." This prompted the Tax Court to say:
The payment by petitioner corporation of $8,400 per year
rental will give at least a color of verity to the petitioner's
advertisement that it had moved into 'a low rent' district.
While it is regrettable from the undisputed evidence in this
case that petitioner's customers did not 'save the difference,'
the law will permit the government to 'tax the difference.'
Many corporations and stockholders have unnecessarily been sub-
ject to double taxes upon the sale of real estate. If the corporation
sells its real estate at a profit, it is required to pay a tax thereon.
Later, upon distribution of the profit as dividends, or upon liquida-
5o Regs. 111. Sec. 29.23 (a) -10; Main & McKinney Building Co. v. Commissioner,
113 F(2d) 8 (CCA 5th 1940), cert. den. 311 U.S. 688; Southwestern Hotel Co.
v. United States, 115 F(2d) 686 (CCA 5th 1940) cert. den. 312 U. S. 703.
51 Regs 111, Sec. 29.23 (a)-10.
527 T.C. 1129 (1946).
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tion, another tax is paid by the stockholders. Where a corporation
wishes to sell all of its assets, and will realize a profit on such sale,
careful consideration should be given to the dissolution and the dis-
tribution of the assets of the corporation to the stockholders prior
to any sale. The stockholders could then negotiate and arrange for
a sale. The danger in this procedure, however, is pointed out in
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co. 53 Here the corporation desired
to sell certain property. It negotiated for a sale but prior to the
consummation thereof, negotiations were broken off. The corpora-
tion was dissolved; the assets were distributed to the stockholders.
Then the stockholders resumed negotiations with the same prospec-
tive purchasers and consummated the sale. The Supreme Court held
that the sale by the stockholders under such circumstances was a
sale by the corporation and it subjected the corporation to a tax
on the gain.
If a corporation is to be dissolved and stockholders are to make
the sale, the dissolution and distribution of the assets should take
place before a prospective purchaser is found and negotiations for
the sale undertaken. Under such circumstances the Court Holding
Co. case will not apply.
The stockholders, upon the dissolution of the corporation, will be
required to pay a gains tax measured by the difference between what
they paid for their stock and the fair market value of the property
received upon liquidation."' The fair market value will probably be
the same or reasonably close to the price at which the stockholders
will later sell the property. Thus, only one tax on the gain will be
payable.
CORPORATE PROBLEMS
The field of corporate activity is replete with tax problems, dangers
and pitfalls. Some problems are simple; others defy comprehension.
A simple situation may be illustrated by the unwary owner of
all of the stock of a corporation owning real estate. He dissolved
the corporation and personally took title to the property. However,
he failed to consider that the market value of the property at the
time of dissolution is much more than he paid for his shares. Equi-
ties had been built up over a period of years; indebtednesses had
been paid off through earnings. The taxpayer was subjected to a
gains tax upon the difference between the cost of his stock and the
present market value of the real estate - a result as undesirable
as it was unanticipated.
53 324 U.S.331 (1945).
54Sec. 111; Sec. 115(c) I.R.C.
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A great many problems arise under Section 115 of the Internal
Revenue Code with regard to the liquidation of corporation either
in whole or in part. The problem frequently arises where a corpora-
tion has accumulated substantial surplus. The stockholders do not
want to receive dividends because of their own high tax brackets,
but would be anxious to have the accumulated profits if it could be
received by way of a partial liquidation and redemption of their
shares on a capital gains basis.
The Internal Revenue Code provides 5 that if a corporation can-
cels or redeems its stock at such time and in such manner as to
make the distribution and cancellation or redemption, in whole or
in part, essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend,
the amount paid in redemption shall be treated as a taxable dividend.
Thus, if there are earnings and profits, accumulated after February
28, 1913, available for use in connection with a partial redemption
and cancellation of stock, there is grave danger that such redemption
will be construed as the payment of a taxable dividend and taxed to
the stockholders as ordinary income rather than at capital gains
rates. This will be true unless there is a sound business reason
requiring the reduction of capital or unless the redemption and can-
cellation takes place at a time and in a manner clearly evidencing
no purpose of distributing corporate profits.56
The tests for determining whether or not a partial liquidation
shall be treated as a distribution of earnings may be summarized as
follows :5 (1) Capitalization largely represented by earnings capital-
ized through the issue of stock dividends; (2) Relatively poor divi-
dend paying record; (3) Proportional ownership of shareholders un-
changed; (4) No need for the corporation to adopt a policy of
contraction; (5) Initiative for distribution came from stockholders
who need the cash; (6) Corporation continues to operate at a
profit.
It should be noted, however, that the ultimate criterion of the
application of Section 115(g) is "the net effect of the distribution
rather than the motive and the plans of the taxpayer or his cor-
poration."5 8
One method of distributing earnings without having stockholders
incur surtax liability on dividends is, of course, through a com-
plete liquidation of the corporation. Amounts received in complete
liquidation will be treated as having been received in payment for
-55Ses. 115(g) I.R.C.
56 Commissioner v. Bolson, 70 F(2d) 304 (CCA 7th 1934) ; Upham v. Commis-
sioner, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945); Manning v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 853 (1944).51 Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F(2d) 937 (App. D.C. 1940).
58 Flannagan v. Helvering, supra.
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the stock. The transaction would result in a capital gain or loss.59
Such a step, however, means "going out of business."
Sometimes a redemption, in whole or in part, takes place in
connection with a recapitalization involving an exchange of the re-
deemed stock for other securities of the corporation. Common stock
might be surrendered in exchange for other common stock and de-
benture bonds. If such exchange takes place under circumstances
not reflecting a sound business purpose, it might be construed as
involving a taxable dividend. Two recent cases illustrate the prob-
lem. These are the Bazley6° and the Adams6 ' cases. In both a
closely owned corporation following the recapitalization provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code62 issued common stock and long term
debenture bonds in exchange for its common stock. The recapital-
ization provisions were adhered to in all formal respects but the
Treasury nevertheless contended successfully that the transactions
were essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend
and that they served no legitimate corporate purpose as to recapital-
ization 6 s
The position of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the
Bazley and Adams cases illustrates the principle that formal adherence
to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code or to the require-
ments of state law do not absolutely control tax liability. The classic
case, of course, is Gregory v. Helvering,6 where a series of transac-
tions which followed the reorganization provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code in every technical respect were nevertheless held by
the Supreme Court not to be entitled to the benefits of the reorgan-
ization provision because their sole and admitted purpose was tax
avoidance. Tax avoidance is not a sufficient business purpose.
Problems relating to partial liquidations or redemptions are not
unrelated to Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code which pro-
vides a penalty upon corporations accumulating surplus beyond reason-
able business needs. Stockholders of many close corporations have
difficult choices to make. If dividends are paid, their personal high
tax rates will consume most of them. If dividends are not paid,
Section 102 may impose a penalty of at least 272%. In approaching
a Section 102 situation, a careful analysis should be made of the
history of the business, its present and future needs and plans. Such
an analysis may reveal sufficient need for the accumulated surplus.
51 Sec. 115(1) I.R.C.
6o 155 F(2d) 237 (CCA 3rd 1946).
61 155 F(2d) 246 (CCA 3rd 1946).
62 Sec. 112(g) (1) (E)'T.R.C.
63 The Bazley and Adams cases are now pending on certiorari before the United
States Supreme Court.
64 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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If reasons are not uncovered, it might nevertheless, under certain
circumstances, be cheaper to pay the penalty imposed by the section
than pay dividends to stockholders in whose hands the distribution
would be taxed at rates substantially higher than the corporate rate
plus the penalty.
Section 102 should be considered in organizing new corporations.
The capital structure should be such as to make necessary the accumu-
lation of working capital out of profits. The coropration may thus
be placed in a position where it will be unable to pay dividends
until such time when adequate working capital has been accumulated.
When a corporation pays dividends in kind rather than in money,
the question arises whether such payment results in a taxable gain
or deductible loss to the corporation. Much depends upon the word-
ing of the resolution declaring the dividend.
Where the property which is to be paid as a dividend has in-
creased in value, the resolution should declare the dividend in terms
of the assets themselves, i.e., dividends payable in Y Company stock,
or in X Company bonds. In such case, the difference between basis
and fair market value would not be taxable to the corporation. If
a loss resulted, such loss would likewise not be deductible by the
corporation. 5
Where property to be used for dividend purposes has depreciated
in value and the corporation wants to realize a loss, then the resolu-
tion declaring the dividend should declare it in terms of dollars
and after that the property should be distributed. Then the corpora-
tion can claim the difference between basis and fair market value,
at which value it was distributed, as a loss. 6
Where a salary is voted for an officer of a closed corporation, and
such officer owns directly or indirectly fifty per cent or more of
the stock of the corporation, the salary must actually be paid within
two and one-half months after the close of the corporation's fiscal
year.', The same rule applies with respect to interest which may
be due a stockholder. It applies even though the salary or interest is
accrued on the books of the corporation as a liability. Payment by
note of the amount due a principal officer and stockholder will not
be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute, 9
65 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Commissioner, 27 BTA 1200, 29 B.T.A.
934, rev'd, 74 F(2d) 972 (CCA 4th 1935), but in effect aff'd by Supreme Court,
which reversed CCA 4th in part, 296 U.S. 200; Commissioner v. Columbia
Pacific Shipping Co., 77 r(2d) 759 (CCA 9th 1935).66 Note 65, supra. Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A.
1109; A.R.R. 435, C.B. June 1921, p. 27.
67 Sec. 24(b) (1) I.R.C.
68 Sec. 24(c) (3) I.R.C.
69 Miller v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 729 (1946). But see Musselman Hub-Brake Co.
v. Commissioner, 139 F(2d) 65 (CCA 6th 1943).
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and will result in the disallowance of the salary or interest deduc-
tion claimed.
MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
In selling a business, specific arrangements are often made for
the seller not to compete. If the amount paid for the agreement
not to compete is to be deducted by the purchaser, the agreement
should specifically state the consideration paid for this covenant and
should fix the period during which it will be in effect.70 If the amount
paid for such a covenant is not specifically stated, the amount to be
amortized cannot be ascertained. The cost of eliminating the com-
petition must then be treated as a capital expenditure, as part of
the cost of acquiring the business. Unless a definite period of non-
competition is provided, there would be no basis for determining
the time over which the consideration paid for the covenant should
be amortized and deducted.
7
2
Some interesting problems arise in connection with the repayment
of debts. Suppose A owes B $10,000. B is willing to take stock in
the X Company, which is owned by A, in payment. This stock, now
worth $10,000, cost A only $3,000. If A transfers the stock in pay-
ment of his $10,000 debt, he realized a capital gain of $7,000 and
has subjected himself to a capital gains tax.7 If, however, he had
simply paid the debt in cash, he would not have fallen into the trap
of incurring a taxable gain by paying a debt.
The same principle applies in the case of a fiduciary who makes
a distribution to a legatee or beneficiary in kind rather than in cash.
The fiduciary is taxed with the difference between the basis of the
assets distributed and the value at which they are distributed to the
legatee or beneficiary.78
An analogous situation relates to the payment of interest. Assume
A owes a debt and accumulated interest thereon. The debt and the
interest are cancelled by the execution and delivery of a new note
to cover both the principal and the accumulated interest. If A is
on the cash basis, he is not entitled to an interest deduction because
there actually was no payment of interest. It would be deductible
only when finally paid.7- On the other hand, if A had borrowed
money to pay the interest from someone other than his present creditor,
he would be entitled to a deduction for the interest paid. 7- The same
70 A. Levy & J. Zentner Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 38, 1934.
72 J. I. Case Co. v. United States, 32 F Supp. 754 (Ct. Cis. 1940). B. T. Babbitt,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 693 (1935).
'72 Huberman v. Commissioner, decided June 30, 1943 (1943 P-H Memorandum
Decisions Service Par. 43,323).
7Kenan, Jr. v. Commissioner, 114 F(2d) 217 (CCA 2nd 1940).
u Eckert v. -Burnet, 283 U.S. 140 (1931) ; Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940);
United States v. Collier, 104 F(2d) 42 (CCA 5th 1939).
75 Cf. Humphrey v. Commissioner, 91 F(2d) 155 (CCA 9th 1937).
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principle would apply in the case of interest on life insurance loans.
The interest, if not paid, is added to principal. It is not deductible
when added to the principal.76 However, when payment on the re-
newed loan is made, either in full or in part, the interest is deductible.7
CONCLUSION
Tax pitfalls are as many and as varied as the variety of transac-
tions that occur between people. No transaction involving money
or property should be consummated until the tax implications have
been fully explored and evaluated.
76Alsberg v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 61 (1940); Prince v. Commissioner, 39
B.T.A. 487 (1939).
77 G.C.M. 2861, C.B. June 1928, p. 255; Bureau ruling, July 12, 1946, 1946 P-H
Par. 76,300; Estate of Bowen v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1 (1943).
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